Anthony Wilson
Admiralty Law
Mariner Security: Prevalent piracy concerns Mariners,should more emphasis on lethal defense be researched for transits through pirated waters.
Piracy has burdened the maritime commerce before present days. The earliest evidence of piracy is recorded in the exploit of the Sea People, a confederation of seafarers which caused political disruptions to attempt to control Egyptian territory in the late 19th dynasty of Ramesses III. Modern acts of piracy has burgeon into criminal organizations which terrorizes for monetary bounties. Scanty groups of privateers would decamp from a mother vessel and embark a transiting vessel of choice. Predators of the sea, these scoundrels endanger the welfare of seafarers, safety of navigation, progressive maritime commerce. Etymology defines the word “pirate” as a 13th century latin derived word meaning “sailor, sea robber”, “one who attacks”, “to attack or make hostile attempt on”. How unfortunate to be characterized as a pirate. This vile word embraces beastly exploits committed by malefactors of the sea.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as any participation or illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or aircraft and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
Legal issues that arise from pirate persecution are as followed according to Dr. Douglas Guilfoyle: geographic extent of the offense, where maritime jurisdiction is examined; limitations inherent in the definition; the relationship between the treaty definition and customary international law; the extent of powers granted to suppress piracy; and whether there are any limitations or rules of priority in exercising jurisdiction over pirates.
“Anima furandi” , robbery or forcible depredation upon the sea. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 5 Wheat . 153 (1820) the fine definition of piracy was to be examined. Thomas Smith was indicted for piracy for the mutiny of the Crello, violent seizure of the vessel Irresistible, and committing offensive acts of plunder and robbery. The circuit court questioned the definition of piracy and whether it is punishable under the Act of Congress. Justice Story delivered the following opinion, “ That if any person or persons whatsoever shall, upon the high seas, commit the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders shall be brought into or found in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof shall be punished with death.” The importance of this case is whether the Act of 1819 constitutes an exercise of the power delegated to Congress upon the subject of piracy. The Constitution declares that Congress shall have power "to define and punish piracy and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." The argument which has been urged in behalf of the prisoner is that Congress is bound to define, in terms, the offense of piracy, and is not at liberty to leave it to be ascertained by judicial interpretation. If the argument be well founded, it seems admitted by the counsel that it equally applies to the 8th section of the Act of Congress of 1790, ch. 9, which declares that robbery and murder committed on the high seas shall be deemed piracy, and yet, notwithstanding a series of contested adjudications on this section, no doubt has hitherto been breathed of its conformity to the Constitution. The construction contended for proceeds upon too narrow a view of the language of the Constitution. The power given to Congress is not merely "to define and punish piracy;" if it were, the words "to define," would seem almost superfluous, since the power to punish piracy would be held to include the power of ascertaining and fixing the definition of the crime. And it has been very justly observed in a celebrated commentary that the definition of piracy might have been left without inconvenience to the law of nations. Power is also given "to define and punish felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations." The term "felonies" has been supposed in the same work not to have a very exact and determinate meaning in relation to offenses at the common law committed within the body of a county. To define piracy in the sense of the Constitution is merely to enumerate the crimes which shall constitute piracy, and this may be done either by a reference to crimes having a technical name and determinate extent or by enumerating the acts in detail upon which the punishment is inflicted. It is to be certified to the circuit court that upon the facts stated, this case is piracy, as defined by the law of nations. A special verdict finds that the prisoner is guilty of the plunder and robbery charged in the indictment, and finds certain additional facts from which it is most manifest that he and his associates were, at the time of committing the offense, freebooters upon the sea, not under the acknowledged authority or deriving protection from the flag or commission of any government.
“Mare liberum” , the freedom of the sea. Article 87-88, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea assures peaceful transit to allow vessel's independence over the high seas and connecting waters. Under Law, to prosecute for piracy, maritime jurisdiction is surveyed for the correct application, therefore tort is unhampered by uncertainty of quilt or aquittal. Jurisdiction includes territorial seas owned by Country and State. Limitations are allocated whereas disputed boundaries are subject of treaties negotiated through diplomacy. Aggressive war torn nations are quarreling over disputed sea boundaries, therefore responsibilities and laws revolves around the regional regulation of maritime legislation. Treaties cosigned between advocates of countries agree to territorial sea boundaries that entail specific duties and rights mandated by governmental State laws. According to the Criminal Resource Manual, Maritime Jurisdiction, the territorial sea , for the U.S., was extended from 3 to 12 nautical miles by Presidential Proclamation 5928 of December 27, 1988. Legislation fancy their own prosecution by custom, favor over nationality is prominent because inhumane acts due to criminal reformation. The U.S.“long arm” of the law is restricted from extraditing infamous criminals for acts of terrorism on the “high seas”. British admiralty law courts bestowed the ante revolutionary colonies in America and other settlements established in the West Indies admiralty jurisdiction to allow trial and punishment of pirates whom tormented the high seas. Punishment for piracy was an inevitable death. Privateer Captain William Kidd met his death for his exploits as a pirate, his life concluded with a hanging from the gallows, then the taking of his lifeless body to be washed by three tidal occurrences, finally his remains to be caged and tarred to fair warn the masses of a privateer's life. United States v. Jackalow, 66 U.S. 1 Black 484 (1861), speculation of jurisdiction arose as to give testimony to whether to give a circuit court of the United States jurisdiction of an offense not committed within its district, it must appear not only that the accused party was first apprehended in that district, but also that the offense was committed out of the jurisdiction of any state and not within any other district of the United States; whether a particular place is within the boundaries of a state is not a question of law for the court, but a matter of fact for the jury to determine; and a special verdict finding that the offense was committed by the prisoner at a place designated, but omitting to find that it was outside the limits of any state, must be set aside. The indictment charges that the prisoner, with force and arms, on the high seas, in waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, on board of an American vessel called the Spray, piratically, felonious, and violently did assault one John F. Leete, the master of the vessel, putting him in bodily fear. The indictment was found under the 3d section of the Act of Congress of May 15, 1820, which enacts that if any person shall, upon the high seas or in any open road stead or any haven, basin, or bay, or in any river &c., commit the crime of robbery in or upon any ship or vessel or upon any of the ship's company &c., or the lading thereof &c., on being convicted before the circuit court of the United States for the district into which he shall be brought or on which he shall be found, shall suffer death. There is a provision which declares that nothing in the section shall be construed to deprive any particular state of its jurisdiction over the offense when committed within the body of a county, or authorize the courts of the United States to try such offenders after conviction or acquittance for the same offense in a state court. The 2d section of the 3d article of the Constitution provides that "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the state where the crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed." Crimes committed against the laws of the United States out of the limits of a state are not local, but may be tried at such place as Congress shall designate by law, but are local if committed within the state. Cases must then be tried in the district in which the offense was committed. 15 How. 488, 6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The special verdict finds that the offense in this case was committed upon the Spray, lying in waters adjoining the State of Connecticut between Norwalk harbor and Westchester County in New York at a place five miles eastward of Lyons' Point and a mile and a half from the Connecticut shore. Whether this place thus described is out of the jurisdiction of a state or not is not found, and is, of course, necessarily left to the court to determine. The learned judge of the district court, sitting in the circuit with the presiding judge, in a very carefully considered examination of the question, came to the conclusion that the place where the offense was committed was within the jurisdiction of New York. The boundary of New York for the purpose of determining it or even expressing an opinion upon it, but for the purpose of saying that the boundary of a state, when a material fact in the determination of the extent of the jurisdiction of a court, is not a simple question of law. The description of a boundary may be a matter of construction, which belongs to the court, but the application of the evidence in the ascertainment of it as thus described and interpreted, with a view to its location and settlement, belongs to the jury. All the testimony bearing upon this question, whether of maps, surveys, practical location, and the like, should be submitted to them under proper instructions to find the fact. A new trial was granted.
“Res ipsa loquitor”, the thing speaks for itself. There are many interpretations of the term “vessel”, as the world evolves, that term will be under scrutiny for clarification. An objects prenomen warrants status by characteristics engineered by individuals with liberal aspirations. The Shipping Act of 1916 defines “vessel” to include all waters craft and other artificial contrivances of whatever description and at whatever stage of construction, whether on the stocks or launched, which are used or are capable of being or are intended to be used as a means of transportation on water. Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Company, 119 U.S. 625 (1887), a salvage company suing for service rendered in the allision between a floating dry dock and M/V Clintonia, defendant argue that a fixed structure contrived for the purpose of taking ships out of the water in order to repair them, and for no other purpose, consisting of a large oblong box with a flat bottom and perpendicular sides, with no means of propulsion either by wind, steam, or otherwise, and not designed for navigation, but only as a floating dry dock, permanently moored, is not a subject of salvage service, therefore the creation of an appendage of an extended landmass The valiant efforts of argument ensued as to whether the structure is a “vessel”. The respondents pleaded first res judicata, alleging that a similar libel for the same cause had been formerly filed in the same court and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. This plea was overruled. Their second plea was to the effect that the case is not one of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; that the assistance rendered by the libellants to the dry dock was not a salvage service; that the dry dock is not devoted to the purpose of transportation and commerce, nor intended for navigation; that it is nothing more than pieces of lumber, fastened together and placed upon the water to receive vessels for repair. A fixed structure, such as this dry dock is, not used for the purpose of navigation, is not a subject of salvage service any more than is a wharf or a warehouse when projecting into or upon the water. The fact that it floats on the water does not make it a ship or vessel, and no structure that is not a ship or vessel is a subject of salvage. Lord Justice Brett said, "The words 'ship' and 'boat' are used, but it seems plain to me that the word 'ship' is not used in the technical sense, as denoting a vessel of a particular rig. In popular language, ships are of different kinds barks, brigs, schooners, sloops, cutters. The word includes anything floating in or upon the water, built in a particular form and used for a particular purpose. In this case, the 'vessel,' if she may be so called, was built for a particular purpose.” A vessel should be described as any object or apparatus with the intended use for navigational purposes. An universal definition of the term should well examined for maritime jurisdiction. In adherence to the definition would include vessels as such types like MODU's, which a floating objects, and fixed structures such as drilling units permanently affixed to the subsurface on the sea floor.
“Entitās”, entity. A “vessel” is known as an entity, something having real or distinct existence; a thing; a being; the essence or real at nature, that can be bounded to the same laws as similar to human common law. If so is factual, a vessel's protection from any harm should be similar or parallel to those of a human civil right. Protection from internal and external oppositions should upheld by law and any sea-going vessel operators. Further research should be investigated into training officer's in defensive strategies in protection of vessel and crew when pirated.
“Hostis humani generis” , an enemy of all mankind. Public enemy of the State, a pirate fears no redemption as to acts he/she will commit. The stakes are “high” when involving oneself in such horrendous acts, a pirate's reputation for the morality of life is nonexistence. “Show No Mercy” to those whom threaten entities, beings with purpose. United States v. Shi, 396 F. Supp., (Cir. 9Th 2008), this case is an example which the court is in question to decide whether a foreign national who forcibly seizes control of a foreign vessel in international waters may be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States when such vessel is intercepted by federal authorities. On March 14, 2002, the Full Means No. 2, a Taiwanese fishing vessel registered in the Republic of the Seychelles, was sailing in international waters off the coast of Hawaii. The Captain of the vessel was Taiwanese, crew members including Lei Shi,the ship's cook, were mainland Chinese. According to Shi, the Captain and First Mate beat and harassed him repeatedly and demoted Shi from the position of cook to deck hand, punctuating the decision with a beating that was particularly severe. A few hours later, Shi retrieved two large knives from the kitchen, ascended to the deck of the ship, and fatally stabbed both men. Shi then ordered the Second Mate to “drive the ship” and ordered the other crew members to throw the captain's body overboard. Shi retained control of the ship for two days, setting a course for China and threatening to scuttle the vessel if his instructions were not obeyed. After the Republic of the Seychelles waived jurisdiction, the ship's acting master permitted the Coast Guard to board. On March 21 at approximately 3:00 pm, FBI agents boarded the vessel and arrested Shi for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2280, which prohibits acts of violence that endanger maritime navigation. In addition, the agents obtained a warrant to search Shi's bunk area on the ship, where they discovered several incriminating letters Shi had written to his family. Shi initially pled guilty, but soon withdrew the plea, and the government filed a superseding indictment. The new indictment charged Shi with one count of seizing control over a ship by force, and two counts of performing an act of violence likely to endanger the safety of the ship. The indictment alleged that the acts charged in all three counts “resulted in death,” elevating the maximum statutory penalty for each from 20 years to life in prison. The jury convicted Shi on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 36 years in prison. Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the United States Constitution , the “Offense Clause”, empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations,” because the high seas, by definition, lie outside United States territory. The Maritime Safety Convention implements an international accord which requires signatory states to “prosecute or extradite” offenders found within their territory regardless of where the offense was committed. In applying the “rough guide” of international law, we turn to the principle of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is based on the premise that offenses against all states may be punished by any state where the offender is found. Accordingly, it allows a state to claim jurisdiction over such an offender even if the offender's acts occurred outside its boundaries and even if the offender has no connection to the state. Because piracy is a universally-condemned crime, a jurisdictional nexus is not required to satisfy due process. As such, the conclusion is that the universal condemnation of Shi's conduct and the existence of the Maritime Safety Convention provided him with all the notice due process requires that he could be prosecuted in this country. Due process does not require a nexus between such an offender and the United States because the universal condemnation of the offender's conduct puts him on notice that his acts will be prosecuted by any state where he is found.
A reinstatement proposal of summary execution is in need of examination. “ Pirates may be captured on the high seas or outside the territory of any state under international law. However, captured pirates are to be tried and punished under the criminal law of the state holding them in local courts, not under international law in an international tribunal. Pirates are somewhat unique in that they are arguably a hybrid between criminal and combatant. They are neither true civilians nor true belligerents. Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether they are protected by international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Convention, or even by country-specific protections for the criminally accused, such as the U.S. Bill of Rights, “ written by the International Law Observer.
Vince Lombardi said "gentlemen we are going to relentlessly pursue perfection, knowing full well that we will not catch it because nothing is perfect." Utopian maritime laws are ideal, but persuading gorilla marauders to disarm and not to pursue vessel for conquest is unimaginable. Pirates often blame political unrest and disenfranchisement for rationalizing attempts to hijack vessels. A reasonable person would have to live the life of a impoverished pirate to embellish poverty in a first person point of view. The trials of life begets strife and misery commonplace to all on Earth. “Common Law “ and humans own instinctive precept of “don't steal things that isn't entitled to you” are coequal hypothesis which is embedded from embryo fertilization through man-womanhood of the populace. Law is seeking revenge from opporitunal thievery, risk takers bear the jeopardy. Seizing the inevitable is the focus of perfection. If the expeditious search of perfection implicate human atrocities, may the corsair be admonished for the amercement of piracy. “Death is the solution to all problems. No man, no problems.” Joseph Stalin
http://www.justice.gov/
http://www.loc.gov/law/index.php , Law Library of Congress
http://supreme.justia.com
"Treaty Jurisdiction over Pirates: A Compilation of Legal Texts with Introductory Notes”by Douglas Guilfoyle http://internationallawobserver.eu/2009/01/05/what-to-do-with-captured-pirates/ , by mpassman,
http://www.legum.org/5352.htm
Admiralty Law
Mariner Security: Prevalent piracy concerns Mariners,should more emphasis on lethal defense be researched for transits through pirated waters.
Piracy has burdened the maritime commerce before present days. The earliest evidence of piracy is recorded in the exploit of the Sea People, a confederation of seafarers which caused political disruptions to attempt to control Egyptian territory in the late 19th dynasty of Ramesses III. Modern acts of piracy has burgeon into criminal organizations which terrorizes for monetary bounties. Scanty groups of privateers would decamp from a mother vessel and embark a transiting vessel of choice. Predators of the sea, these scoundrels endanger the welfare of seafarers, safety of navigation, progressive maritime commerce. Etymology defines the word “pirate” as a 13th century latin derived word meaning “sailor, sea robber”, “one who attacks”, “to attack or make hostile attempt on”. How unfortunate to be characterized as a pirate. This vile word embraces beastly exploits committed by malefactors of the sea.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as any participation or illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or aircraft and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
Legal issues that arise from pirate persecution are as followed according to Dr. Douglas Guilfoyle: geographic extent of the offense, where maritime jurisdiction is examined; limitations inherent in the definition; the relationship between the treaty definition and customary international law; the extent of powers granted to suppress piracy; and whether there are any limitations or rules of priority in exercising jurisdiction over pirates.
“Anima furandi” , robbery or forcible depredation upon the sea. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 5 Wheat . 153 (1820) the fine definition of piracy was to be examined. Thomas Smith was indicted for piracy for the mutiny of the Crello, violent seizure of the vessel Irresistible, and committing offensive acts of plunder and robbery. The circuit court questioned the definition of piracy and whether it is punishable under the Act of Congress. Justice Story delivered the following opinion, “ That if any person or persons whatsoever shall, upon the high seas, commit the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders shall be brought into or found in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof shall be punished with death.” The importance of this case is whether the Act of 1819 constitutes an exercise of the power delegated to Congress upon the subject of piracy. The Constitution declares that Congress shall have power "to define and punish piracy and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." The argument which has been urged in behalf of the prisoner is that Congress is bound to define, in terms, the offense of piracy, and is not at liberty to leave it to be ascertained by judicial interpretation. If the argument be well founded, it seems admitted by the counsel that it equally applies to the 8th section of the Act of Congress of 1790, ch. 9, which declares that robbery and murder committed on the high seas shall be deemed piracy, and yet, notwithstanding a series of contested adjudications on this section, no doubt has hitherto been breathed of its conformity to the Constitution. The construction contended for proceeds upon too narrow a view of the language of the Constitution. The power given to Congress is not merely "to define and punish piracy;" if it were, the words "to define," would seem almost superfluous, since the power to punish piracy would be held to include the power of ascertaining and fixing the definition of the crime. And it has been very justly observed in a celebrated commentary that the definition of piracy might have been left without inconvenience to the law of nations. Power is also given "to define and punish felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations." The term "felonies" has been supposed in the same work not to have a very exact and determinate meaning in relation to offenses at the common law committed within the body of a county. To define piracy in the sense of the Constitution is merely to enumerate the crimes which shall constitute piracy, and this may be done either by a reference to crimes having a technical name and determinate extent or by enumerating the acts in detail upon which the punishment is inflicted. It is to be certified to the circuit court that upon the facts stated, this case is piracy, as defined by the law of nations. A special verdict finds that the prisoner is guilty of the plunder and robbery charged in the indictment, and finds certain additional facts from which it is most manifest that he and his associates were, at the time of committing the offense, freebooters upon the sea, not under the acknowledged authority or deriving protection from the flag or commission of any government.
“Mare liberum” , the freedom of the sea. Article 87-88, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea assures peaceful transit to allow vessel's independence over the high seas and connecting waters. Under Law, to prosecute for piracy, maritime jurisdiction is surveyed for the correct application, therefore tort is unhampered by uncertainty of quilt or aquittal. Jurisdiction includes territorial seas owned by Country and State. Limitations are allocated whereas disputed boundaries are subject of treaties negotiated through diplomacy. Aggressive war torn nations are quarreling over disputed sea boundaries, therefore responsibilities and laws revolves around the regional regulation of maritime legislation. Treaties cosigned between advocates of countries agree to territorial sea boundaries that entail specific duties and rights mandated by governmental State laws. According to the Criminal Resource Manual, Maritime Jurisdiction, the territorial sea , for the U.S., was extended from 3 to 12 nautical miles by Presidential Proclamation 5928 of December 27, 1988. Legislation fancy their own prosecution by custom, favor over nationality is prominent because inhumane acts due to criminal reformation. The U.S.“long arm” of the law is restricted from extraditing infamous criminals for acts of terrorism on the “high seas”. British admiralty law courts bestowed the ante revolutionary colonies in America and other settlements established in the West Indies admiralty jurisdiction to allow trial and punishment of pirates whom tormented the high seas. Punishment for piracy was an inevitable death. Privateer Captain William Kidd met his death for his exploits as a pirate, his life concluded with a hanging from the gallows, then the taking of his lifeless body to be washed by three tidal occurrences, finally his remains to be caged and tarred to fair warn the masses of a privateer's life. United States v. Jackalow, 66 U.S. 1 Black 484 (1861), speculation of jurisdiction arose as to give testimony to whether to give a circuit court of the United States jurisdiction of an offense not committed within its district, it must appear not only that the accused party was first apprehended in that district, but also that the offense was committed out of the jurisdiction of any state and not within any other district of the United States; whether a particular place is within the boundaries of a state is not a question of law for the court, but a matter of fact for the jury to determine; and a special verdict finding that the offense was committed by the prisoner at a place designated, but omitting to find that it was outside the limits of any state, must be set aside. The indictment charges that the prisoner, with force and arms, on the high seas, in waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, on board of an American vessel called the Spray, piratically, felonious, and violently did assault one John F. Leete, the master of the vessel, putting him in bodily fear. The indictment was found under the 3d section of the Act of Congress of May 15, 1820, which enacts that if any person shall, upon the high seas or in any open road stead or any haven, basin, or bay, or in any river &c., commit the crime of robbery in or upon any ship or vessel or upon any of the ship's company &c., or the lading thereof &c., on being convicted before the circuit court of the United States for the district into which he shall be brought or on which he shall be found, shall suffer death. There is a provision which declares that nothing in the section shall be construed to deprive any particular state of its jurisdiction over the offense when committed within the body of a county, or authorize the courts of the United States to try such offenders after conviction or acquittance for the same offense in a state court. The 2d section of the 3d article of the Constitution provides that "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the state where the crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed." Crimes committed against the laws of the United States out of the limits of a state are not local, but may be tried at such place as Congress shall designate by law, but are local if committed within the state. Cases must then be tried in the district in which the offense was committed. 15 How. 488, 6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The special verdict finds that the offense in this case was committed upon the Spray, lying in waters adjoining the State of Connecticut between Norwalk harbor and Westchester County in New York at a place five miles eastward of Lyons' Point and a mile and a half from the Connecticut shore. Whether this place thus described is out of the jurisdiction of a state or not is not found, and is, of course, necessarily left to the court to determine. The learned judge of the district court, sitting in the circuit with the presiding judge, in a very carefully considered examination of the question, came to the conclusion that the place where the offense was committed was within the jurisdiction of New York. The boundary of New York for the purpose of determining it or even expressing an opinion upon it, but for the purpose of saying that the boundary of a state, when a material fact in the determination of the extent of the jurisdiction of a court, is not a simple question of law. The description of a boundary may be a matter of construction, which belongs to the court, but the application of the evidence in the ascertainment of it as thus described and interpreted, with a view to its location and settlement, belongs to the jury. All the testimony bearing upon this question, whether of maps, surveys, practical location, and the like, should be submitted to them under proper instructions to find the fact. A new trial was granted.
“Res ipsa loquitor”, the thing speaks for itself. There are many interpretations of the term “vessel”, as the world evolves, that term will be under scrutiny for clarification. An objects prenomen warrants status by characteristics engineered by individuals with liberal aspirations. The Shipping Act of 1916 defines “vessel” to include all waters craft and other artificial contrivances of whatever description and at whatever stage of construction, whether on the stocks or launched, which are used or are capable of being or are intended to be used as a means of transportation on water. Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Company, 119 U.S. 625 (1887), a salvage company suing for service rendered in the allision between a floating dry dock and M/V Clintonia, defendant argue that a fixed structure contrived for the purpose of taking ships out of the water in order to repair them, and for no other purpose, consisting of a large oblong box with a flat bottom and perpendicular sides, with no means of propulsion either by wind, steam, or otherwise, and not designed for navigation, but only as a floating dry dock, permanently moored, is not a subject of salvage service, therefore the creation of an appendage of an extended landmass The valiant efforts of argument ensued as to whether the structure is a “vessel”. The respondents pleaded first res judicata, alleging that a similar libel for the same cause had been formerly filed in the same court and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. This plea was overruled. Their second plea was to the effect that the case is not one of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; that the assistance rendered by the libellants to the dry dock was not a salvage service; that the dry dock is not devoted to the purpose of transportation and commerce, nor intended for navigation; that it is nothing more than pieces of lumber, fastened together and placed upon the water to receive vessels for repair. A fixed structure, such as this dry dock is, not used for the purpose of navigation, is not a subject of salvage service any more than is a wharf or a warehouse when projecting into or upon the water. The fact that it floats on the water does not make it a ship or vessel, and no structure that is not a ship or vessel is a subject of salvage. Lord Justice Brett said, "The words 'ship' and 'boat' are used, but it seems plain to me that the word 'ship' is not used in the technical sense, as denoting a vessel of a particular rig. In popular language, ships are of different kinds barks, brigs, schooners, sloops, cutters. The word includes anything floating in or upon the water, built in a particular form and used for a particular purpose. In this case, the 'vessel,' if she may be so called, was built for a particular purpose.” A vessel should be described as any object or apparatus with the intended use for navigational purposes. An universal definition of the term should well examined for maritime jurisdiction. In adherence to the definition would include vessels as such types like MODU's, which a floating objects, and fixed structures such as drilling units permanently affixed to the subsurface on the sea floor.
“Entitās”, entity. A “vessel” is known as an entity, something having real or distinct existence; a thing; a being; the essence or real at nature, that can be bounded to the same laws as similar to human common law. If so is factual, a vessel's protection from any harm should be similar or parallel to those of a human civil right. Protection from internal and external oppositions should upheld by law and any sea-going vessel operators. Further research should be investigated into training officer's in defensive strategies in protection of vessel and crew when pirated.
“Hostis humani generis” , an enemy of all mankind. Public enemy of the State, a pirate fears no redemption as to acts he/she will commit. The stakes are “high” when involving oneself in such horrendous acts, a pirate's reputation for the morality of life is nonexistence. “Show No Mercy” to those whom threaten entities, beings with purpose. United States v. Shi, 396 F. Supp., (Cir. 9Th 2008), this case is an example which the court is in question to decide whether a foreign national who forcibly seizes control of a foreign vessel in international waters may be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States when such vessel is intercepted by federal authorities. On March 14, 2002, the Full Means No. 2, a Taiwanese fishing vessel registered in the Republic of the Seychelles, was sailing in international waters off the coast of Hawaii. The Captain of the vessel was Taiwanese, crew members including Lei Shi,the ship's cook, were mainland Chinese. According to Shi, the Captain and First Mate beat and harassed him repeatedly and demoted Shi from the position of cook to deck hand, punctuating the decision with a beating that was particularly severe. A few hours later, Shi retrieved two large knives from the kitchen, ascended to the deck of the ship, and fatally stabbed both men. Shi then ordered the Second Mate to “drive the ship” and ordered the other crew members to throw the captain's body overboard. Shi retained control of the ship for two days, setting a course for China and threatening to scuttle the vessel if his instructions were not obeyed. After the Republic of the Seychelles waived jurisdiction, the ship's acting master permitted the Coast Guard to board. On March 21 at approximately 3:00 pm, FBI agents boarded the vessel and arrested Shi for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2280, which prohibits acts of violence that endanger maritime navigation. In addition, the agents obtained a warrant to search Shi's bunk area on the ship, where they discovered several incriminating letters Shi had written to his family. Shi initially pled guilty, but soon withdrew the plea, and the government filed a superseding indictment. The new indictment charged Shi with one count of seizing control over a ship by force, and two counts of performing an act of violence likely to endanger the safety of the ship. The indictment alleged that the acts charged in all three counts “resulted in death,” elevating the maximum statutory penalty for each from 20 years to life in prison. The jury convicted Shi on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 36 years in prison. Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the United States Constitution , the “Offense Clause”, empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations,” because the high seas, by definition, lie outside United States territory. The Maritime Safety Convention implements an international accord which requires signatory states to “prosecute or extradite” offenders found within their territory regardless of where the offense was committed. In applying the “rough guide” of international law, we turn to the principle of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is based on the premise that offenses against all states may be punished by any state where the offender is found. Accordingly, it allows a state to claim jurisdiction over such an offender even if the offender's acts occurred outside its boundaries and even if the offender has no connection to the state. Because piracy is a universally-condemned crime, a jurisdictional nexus is not required to satisfy due process. As such, the conclusion is that the universal condemnation of Shi's conduct and the existence of the Maritime Safety Convention provided him with all the notice due process requires that he could be prosecuted in this country. Due process does not require a nexus between such an offender and the United States because the universal condemnation of the offender's conduct puts him on notice that his acts will be prosecuted by any state where he is found.
A reinstatement proposal of summary execution is in need of examination. “ Pirates may be captured on the high seas or outside the territory of any state under international law. However, captured pirates are to be tried and punished under the criminal law of the state holding them in local courts, not under international law in an international tribunal. Pirates are somewhat unique in that they are arguably a hybrid between criminal and combatant. They are neither true civilians nor true belligerents. Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether they are protected by international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Convention, or even by country-specific protections for the criminally accused, such as the U.S. Bill of Rights, “ written by the International Law Observer.
Vince Lombardi said "gentlemen we are going to relentlessly pursue perfection, knowing full well that we will not catch it because nothing is perfect." Utopian maritime laws are ideal, but persuading gorilla marauders to disarm and not to pursue vessel for conquest is unimaginable. Pirates often blame political unrest and disenfranchisement for rationalizing attempts to hijack vessels. A reasonable person would have to live the life of a impoverished pirate to embellish poverty in a first person point of view. The trials of life begets strife and misery commonplace to all on Earth. “Common Law “ and humans own instinctive precept of “don't steal things that isn't entitled to you” are coequal hypothesis which is embedded from embryo fertilization through man-womanhood of the populace. Law is seeking revenge from opporitunal thievery, risk takers bear the jeopardy. Seizing the inevitable is the focus of perfection. If the expeditious search of perfection implicate human atrocities, may the corsair be admonished for the amercement of piracy. “Death is the solution to all problems. No man, no problems.” Joseph Stalin
http://www.justice.gov/
http://www.loc.gov/law/index.php , Law Library of Congress
http://supreme.justia.com
"Treaty Jurisdiction over Pirates: A Compilation of Legal Texts with Introductory Notes”by Douglas Guilfoyle http://internationallawobserver.eu/2009/01/05/what-to-do-with-captured-pirates/ , by mpassman,
http://www.legum.org/5352.htm